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The Massachusetts Society of Certified Public Accountants (the "Society") and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA" or the "Institute") respectfully submit this 
brief as amici curiae, pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Appellate Procedure 17, in support of 
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP ("Peat Marwick"). 
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW  
The amici address the following issue: 
To what extent, as a matter of law, an accountant's duty of care in the auditing of financial 
statements extends to any persons other than the accountant's client. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Society and Institute adopt the Statement of the Case as set forth in the Brief of the 
Defendant-Appellee Peat Marwick.  
III. INTERESTS OF THE SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE AS AMICI CURIAE  
The Society is a professional association whose membership includes over 7,800 certified public 
accountants licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Among the Society's 
primary purposes are the promotion and maintenance of high professional standards of 
accounting practice in Massachusetts. In furtherance of these goals, the Society sponsors 
educational programs, issues publications and engages in a variety of other activities designed to 
promote the quality and standards for the provision by its members of accounting services in 
Massachusetts. 
As the representative organization of over 7,800 accounting professionals in Massachusetts and a 
concerned observer of the development of accounting policies, the Society is seriously concerned 
about the consequences of expanding the scope of liability for professional negligence of 
accountants, in an attempt to transform their function from that of auditor to that of all-purpose 
insurers of financial statements and the financial viability of any transactions into which the third 
party elects to enter. This is especially so since these matters are already adequately monitored 
by the overall professional standards, and by the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, 
mandatory continuing professional education programs and quality review requirements of the 
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Public Accountancy, the regulatory body which licenses 
and governs the practice of public accountancy in Massachusetts. 
The Institute is the national professional accounting organization, all of whose more than 
331,000 members are certified public accountants ("CPAs"). The Institute's service to the public 
spans more than one hundred years and extends to CPAs who provide a wide array of 
accountancy services through firms of all sizes and as sole practitioners. 
Among the Institute's purposes are the promotion and maintenance of high professional 
standards of practice. In pursuit of these ends, the Institute has been a principal force in 
developing accounting and auditing standards, drafting model legislation, sponsoring educational 
programs and issuing professional publications to improve the quality of service provided by 
CPAs. In particular, the Institute develops the standards that, after due process and formal 
adoption, govern the conduct of the various types of services provided by CPAs with respect to 
financial statements, such as audits, reviews, and compilations, and the reports issued thereon. 
The Institute is accepted as the authoritative source of standards and procedures in the 
accounting profession. Both the Society and Institute are seriously concerned about the scope 
and bases of civil liability for damages arising from actions for the alleged negligent 
performance of audit services. 
IV. ARGUMENT  
The Superior Court in this case was faced with an important issue of first impression -- the extent 
to which an accountant's duty of care in the auditing of financial statements extends to any 
persons other than the accountant's own client. The Superior Court first addressed this question 
when it decided Peat Marwick's motion to dismiss Nycal Corporation's ("Nycal") complaint. The 
Superior Court (Roseman, J.) considered three possible standards governing accountant liability -
- the "near privity" standard, Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the 
"foreseeability" standard. Briefly, the "near privity" standard requires that there be specific 
conduct linking the accountant and the noncontractual party before permitting the imposition of 
liability. Section 552 articulates the necessity that (i) the noncontractual party has been of a 
specific group of persons for whose benefit the accountant intended to supply the information 
and (ii) there has been manifestation of an intent by the accountant that the information was 
supplied for the use that gave rise to plaintiff's loss. The "foreseeability" rule urged by Nycal -
- which is not used by any court in the country -- would allow a negligence claim by any plaintiff 
whose reliance upon an accountant's work-product should have been foreseeable to the 
accountant.  
The Superior Court predicted that Massachusetts would adopt Section 552 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and allowed a "reasonable period of discovery to determine whether there is 
evidence of liability." Nycal Appendix Ex. 6. Nycal and Peat Marwick stipulated to the 
discovery that would be taken. Following the conclusion of that discovery, Peat Marwick moved 
for summary judgment. The Superior Court (Sosman, J.) granted the motion,1 finding that 
"Nycal was not the entity for whose benefit Peat Marwick rendered its auditor's report, nor was 
Nycal within any 'limited group of persons' for whose benefit the report was prepared." 
Accordingly, the Court held that Section 552 did not permit Nycal's claim. 
As shown below, in addition to genuine concerns about the future of the accounting profession if 
the extension of liability of accountants to third parties continues unabated, there are numerous 
public policy considerations that support strict and defined limitations on accountant liability. 
The Society and Institute believe that these public policy considerations are best met by adoption 
of a "near privity" rule of accountant liability, which requires actual conduct linking the 
accountant specifically to the noncontractual party before permitting the imposition of liability. 
The "near privity" rule has been adopted by numerous states, including New York, New Jersey, 
Illinois, Pennsylvania and Maryland. At a minimum, the Society and Institute submit the Court 
should adopt Section 552, the standard adopted in other states, such as California, Arizona, 
Florida, Rhode Island and Texas, which requires a lesser, but certain nexus between the 
accountant and the third party. No state employs the "foreseeability" rule espoused by Nycal, 
which has been soundly and repeatedly rejected by both courts and legislatures.2 
The attractiveness of "deep pocket" accountants3 to disappointed investors has led to a flood of 
lawsuits and class actions alleging various federal and state law claims, including negligence, 
principally arising from misstatement of financial statements. See Private Litigation Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 662-73, 730-39 (1993) (setting forth 
growth in audit-related litigation, and associated costs, of the six largest accounting firms, 
including doubling of the firms' total litigation costs and a ten-fold increase in settlement costs 
for state law claims; Elizabeth MacDonald, More Accounting Firms Are Dumping Risky Clients, 
Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at A2 ("Risky Clients") (reporting that, despite new federal legislation, 
shareholder suits naming accountants as defendants have not declined.) (See attached in 
Addendum A)4. These attempts by third parties to transform accountants into all-purpose 
insurers is, as more fully set forth below, plainly wrong as a matter of both law and public 
policy. 
Unfortunately -- but not surprisingly -- this litigation "explosion" has caused growing numbers of 
accounting firms to close, to stop performing audits, or to reduce significantly their services. See, 
e.g., Risky Clients, Wall St. J., April 25, 1997, at A2 (Big Six firms are dropping clients because 
shareholders and creditors sue so frequently over faulty audits); Dan R. Dalton, et al., The Big 
Chill, J. Acct. November 1994 (many smaller firms no longer provide audit services due to 
litigation exposure) (See attached in Addendum A). 
Accountants also have been forced to avoid "those clients and potential clients that present the 
greatest likelihood of litigation." Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 348 (statement of Jake L. Netterville, then-chairman of the Institute's Board of 
Directors). These entities are often the start-up and growth companies "whose futures are least 
assured and whose stock prices are most volatile . . . . Yet these are the very entities our country 
looks to for technological innovation, the bulk of job creation, and future competitive strength." 
Risky Clients, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at A2 (reporting that firms are "particularly leery of 
start-up companies"). 
It is well-recognized that the audit plays an important role in commerce. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1992); John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the 
Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1929, 1967 n. 158 (1988) ("Limits of Tort 
Reform"). For companies whose stock is publicly traded, an audit is a practical, and under the 
federal securities laws, a statutory, necessity. Increasing audit cost or decreasing audit 
availability may produce substantial barriers to the growth of firms that can no longer afford or 
qualify for accounting services. 
Moreover, given the frequency with which financial transactions today cross state lines, it is 
desirable that there be harmony, clarity and predictability among the various states' accountant 
liability standards. Accordingly, the standard of liability for accountants providing auditing 
services -- presented squarely by this appeal -- is of considerable importance. 
A. Public Policy Considerations Weigh Strongly Against Expansive 
Rules Of Liability For Accountants Performing Routine Audits. 
Numerous courts and commentators have concluded that public policy demands strict and 
defined limits on the liability standards applicable to accountants who provide auditing services. 
The reasons for this are discussed below. 
1. The Nature of an Audit Entails Substantial Complexities and 
the Exercise of Professional Judgment. 
Liability of auditors for financial statement misstatement should be limited because of the sui 
generis nature of an audit, and the inability of auditors to control the risk of the types of claims 
usually brought against them. An overview of the audit function may assist to illuminate the 
impropriety of imposing broad liability on auditors to third parties. 
Corporate financial statements are prepared by management, not by the company's auditors. The 
California Supreme Court recently explained that, "[a]s a matter of commercial reality, audits are 
performed in a client-controlled environment. The client typically prepares its own financial 
statements; it has direct control over and assumes primary responsibility for their contents." Bily 
v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted); see also 
Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor, AICPA Professional Standards AU 
§ 110.02 (AICPA 1991) ("financial statements are management's responsibility"). 
An auditor then performs what is, in his or her professional judgment, an appropriate series of 
inquiries into the company's actions to reach an independent opinion as to whether the 
statements, as of and for the relevant date or period, "fairly" present "in all material respects, [the 
company's] financial position, results of operations, and its cash flows in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles." Id. § 110.01; see also id. at § 110.02 ("the auditor's 
responsibility . . . is confined to the expression of his or her opinion on [management's financial 
statements]"). 
The "generally accepted accounting principles" ("GAAP") with which the client's financial 
statements must comply are codified only in part, and an auditor must derive the applicable 
governing rules from a variety of sources. The Meaning of "Present Fairly in Conformity with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles" in the Independent Auditor's Report, AICPA 
Professional Standards AU § 411.05 (AICPA 1982) (describing four separate sources of 
generally accepted accounting principles). As a leading treatise explains: 
[A]ccounting principles often require 
interpretation and the application of judgment 
before they can be applied to specific 
transactions and other events and 
circumstances, and reasonable preparers of 
financial statements and auditors can disagree 
about those interpretations and judgments. 
Jerry Sullivan, Philip L. Defliese & Henry R. Jaenicke, Montgomery's Auditing 19 (1985); see 
also Bily, 834 P.2d at 750 ("GAAP include broad statements of accounting principles amounting 
to aspirational norms as well as more specific guidelines and illustrations."). 
In developing an opinion as to whether the client's financial statements comply with GAAP, the 
accountant obviously cannot reconstruct every transaction that the company entered into over the 
period covered by the audit or independently value every one of the client's assets and liabilities. 
"For practical reasons of time and cost, an audit rarely, if ever, examines every accounting 
transaction in the records of a business. The planning and execution of an audit therefore requires 
a high degree of professional skill and judgment." Bily, 834 P.2d at 749. 
"Generally accepted auditing standards" ("GAAS") promulgated by the Institute prescribe the 
procedures to be applied when reviewing the client's financial records when conducting an audit. 
The auditor initially surveys the client's business operations and accounting systems to make 
decisions as to the scope of the audit examination and what methods and procedures will be 
used. Planning and Supervision, AICPA Professional Standards AU § 311.01 (AICPA 1994). 
The auditor then evaluates the internal financial control systems of the client and performs 
compliance tests to determine the extent to which it will rely on the control system in conducting 
its audit. Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit, AICPA Professional 
Standards AU §§ 319.01-.02 (AICPA 1997). Throughout the process, results are examined and 
procedures are re-evaluated and modified to reflect discoveries made by the auditors. See Willis 
W. Hagen, II, Certified Public Accountant liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance With 
GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. Contemp. L. 65, 67-68 (1987); accord Bily, 834 P.2d at 750. 
These standards leave considerable room for the exercise of professional judgment. See, e.g., 
Evidential Matter, AICPA Professional Standards AU § 326.22 (AICPA 1987) ("[t]he amount 
and kinds of evidential matter required to support an informed opinion are matters for the auditor 
to determine in the exercise of his or her professional judgment"); Bily, 834 P.2d at 750. Thus, 
"the [audit] process is far from mechanical. Instead, modern audits of complex enterprises 
require accountants to make numerous judgments about the proper characterizations of the data 
and the reliability of the client's accounting systems." Siliciano, Limits of Tort Reform, 86 Mich. 
L. Rev. at 1962 n. 158. 
The Nature of the Audit Function Necessitates Strict Limits on 
Auditors' Liability to Third Parties. 
In light of these particular characteristics of the audit function, courts almost uniformly have 
rejected broad liability for auditors. Over sixty years ago in the landmark decision in Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), Justice (then Chief Judge) Cardozo recognized the 
adverse policy consequences of expansive liability rules. Holding that an accountant was not 
liable to a third party for common law negligence, the court concluded that such liability would 
be wholly incompatible with the nature of the auditing process: 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless 
slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or 
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, 
may expose accountants to a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a 
business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw 
may not exist in the implication of a duty that 
exposes to these consequences. 
Id. at 444 (emphasis added). 
The principles of negligence law and public policy recognized in Ultramares have been widely 
adopted and reaffirmed in recent cases. For example, in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, remittitur modified, 489 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1985), the New 
York Court of Appeals expressly reaffirmed that the Ultramares standard "remains valid as the 
predicate for imposing liability upon accountants to noncontractual parties for the negligent 
preparation of financial reports . . ." 483 N.E.2d at 1155. Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has twice invoked the language of Ultramares in warning against the dangers of liability 
for accountants that is unlimited in scope. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 
n.33 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975). 
This Court, likewise, has invoked the language of Ultramares in restricting the liability of 
professionals to third parties and applying a near privity standard. See, e.g., Craig v. Everett M. 
Brooks Company, 351 Mass. 497, 500-01 (1967) (in assessing a claim by a general contractor 
against an engineer, this Court, citing Ultramares, was careful to avoid exposing a professional 
to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."); 
Anthony v. Vaughan, 356 Mass. 673, 675 (1970) (citing Ultramares, in finding that defendant-
insurer was not liable to a plaintiff-third-party beneficiary who was not present at a meeting 
where negligent representations were made, as well as expressing concerns about the impropriety 
of allowing indeterminate liability to third parties). 
a. Broad Liability Standards Would Unfairly Subject Auditors to 
a Burden Entirely Out of Proportion to Their Role in Financial 
Transactions. 
Justice Cardozo rejected an expansive liability rule because the resulting burden -- "liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" -- would be grossly 
excessive in view of the auditor's role in the financial reporting process and the nature of the 
auditor's task. That fundamental insight is as true today as it was when Ultramares was decided, 
and perhaps even more so, given the increasingly complex and multi-party nature of financial 
transactions. 
First, the accountant's role concerning the issuance of financial statements is always secondary to 
that of the client. See pp. 7-10, supra. As the California Supreme Court noted, "the client retains 
effective primary control of the financial reporting process." Bily, 834 P.2d at 762. The client 
prepares the financial statements; the accountant merely renders an opinion on them. This 
relationship makes it all but impossible for the auditor to eliminate the risk of liability. It is 
fundamentally unfair to hold an accountant liable for negligence arising from matters over which 
it ultimately has limited control. 
The very nature of the audit process also supports strict and defined limits on auditor liability. 
See pp. 7-10, supra. "[A]n audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that . . . can be 
easily checked against uniform standards of indisputable accuracy . . . . Although ultimately 
expressed in shorthand form, the report is the final product of a complex process involving 
discretion and judgment on the part of the auditor at every stage." Bily, 834 P.2d at 763 (citation 
omitted). The character of the auditing process thus makes accountants especially prone to 
second guessing and allegations of "negligence by hindsight." See Bily, 834 P.2d at 763 ("Using 
different initial assumptions and approaches, different sampling techniques, and the wisdom of 
20-20 hindsight, few CPA audits would be immune from criticism."). 
Expansive liability to third parties also would subject auditors to "limitless financial exposure." 
Id. (footnote omitted). The auditor would thus be transformed into a virtual guarantor of any 
transaction upon which he or she reports. In what has become a typical, but unjust, scenario, the 
California Supreme Court noted, 
[t]he client, its promoters, and its managers 
have . . . left the scene, headed in most cases 
for government-supervised liquidation or the 
bankruptcy court. The auditor has now 
assumed center stage as the remaining solvent 
defendant and is faced with a claim for all 
sums of money ever loaned to or invested in 
the client. Yet the auditor may never have been 
aware of the existence, let alone the nature or 
scope, of the third party transaction that 
resulted in the claim. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The California Supreme Court correctly concluded that "such disproportionate liability cannot 
fairly be justified on moral, ethical, or economic grounds." Id. at 764. Accord Ultramares, 174 
N.E. at 444. "[I]mposing unlimited liability on certified public accounting firms will consistently 
place huge, unfair, and economically inefficient burdens on relatively minor 
participants . . . because accountants are not well positioned to serve as guarantors of the 
soundness of the business enterprises they audit." Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, 
Accountant liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New 
Limiting Principle, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 345, 352-53 (1992) ("Search for a New Limiting 
Principle"). 
Although these burdens would fall across the entire accounting profession, they would be 
particularly acute for sole practitioners and small firms. These accountants typically perform 
audits for small to mid-sized companies and, because of their limited resources, would face 
potentially ruinous liability to third parties if any one of their clients failed. 
Moreover, the amount of this liability in any particular case would turn not on the accountant's 
own actions, but instead on the size of the transactions between the prospective plaintiffs and the 
accountant's client. An accountant collects a fee only from the client, and that fee is in no way 
correlated to the number of copies the client may choose to make of the audit report, to the 
number of third parties who may seek to rely on it, or to the financial magnitude of the 
transactions those third parties may undertake in purported reliance on the report. The accountant 
is not a party to such transactions, and does not share in any gains that his or her client may 
realize from them. Nor does the accountant receive any compensation from the "free riding" third 
parties who claim to have relied on the audit report and then expect that the auditor will function 
as an all-purpose insurer of the financial statements and of any transactions into which the third 
party elected to enter. It would be grossly unfair to impose such immense liability on an 
accountant for mere negligence.6 
One further consideration is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of expanded liability -- 
namely, the remote relationship between the audit and the third party's actions. A third party's 
claimed "reliance" on audited financial statements is "often . . . attenuated by unrelated business 
factors that underlie investment and credit decisions." Bily, 834 P.2d at 764. In litigation, 
however, an investor's "revisionist" assertions of "reliance" on an auditor's report are "easily 
fabricated" and difficult to refute. Id. at 764 & n.12. As the Bily court stated: 
Investment and credit decisions are by their nature complex and multifaceted. Although an audit 
report might play a role in such decisions, reasonable and prudent investors and lenders will dig 
far deeper in their "due diligence" investigations than the surface level of an auditor's opinion . . . 
[Y]et, . . . the CPA auditor is a prime target in litigation claiming investor and creditor economic 
losses because it is the only available (and solvent) entity that had any direct contact with the 
client's business affairs. 
Id. at 763 (citing Siliciano, Limits of Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 1932-33). 
b. Expansive Liability Standards Cannot Be Justified as an 
Incentive Necessary to Ensure Audit Quality. 
Nycal argues that, without broad standards of liability, accountants will have little incentive to 
provide their services properly. As courts have recognized, there already are numerous 
compelling reasons for an accountant to perform audits competently and honestly, beyond the 
obvious one of maintaining the value of his or her professional reputation.7 
• tort law requires accountants to exercise due care with respect to 
their clients (see, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, (74 N.E. 441 
(N.Y. 1931); 
• accountants are subject to liability to third parties for common law 
fraud (id.); 
• Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC 
Rule 10b-5 subject an accountant to damages liability when he 
makes a material misstatement with scienter in connection with a 
securities transaction; 
• to maintain a license, accountants in Massachusetts are required by 
the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Public Accountancy to 
comply with a Code of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct, 
to engage in mandatory continuing professional education and to 
have their firm's work subjected to periodic external quality 
review, (see 252 CMR 2.10, 2.14, 2.15 and 3.00); 
• the AICPA's Code of Professional Responsibility requires the 
Institute's members to exercise due care and comply with standards 
promulgated by the AICPA and its Ethics Division (AICPA, 
ET 201.01-203.01), with disciplinary oversight by the Institute; 
• the Securities and Exchange Commission may bar an accountant 
from practicing before it if it finds that the accountant has engaged 
in "unethical or improper professional conduct" (17 C.F.R. 
§ 201.102(e)(ii) (1997)). 
Accountants thus already have sufficient incentives to be as careful as they can in conducting 
audits. It cannot plausibly be argued that adding the additional threat of unlimited liability to 
third parties on top of this already lengthy list of potential sanctions is a reasonable or necessary 
deterrent. 
Indeed, expansive liability rules may have the opposite effect. As the Bily court stated, "'[w]hy 
offer a higher quality product if you will be sued regardless whenever there is a precipitous 
decline in stock prices?'" 834 P.2d at 766 (citation omitted). 
Finally, imposing reasonable limits on the scope of an auditor's liability will encourage 
responsible investment practices. As explained in Bily: 
[A] third party might expend its own resources 
to verify the client's financial statements . . . . 
Or it might commission its own audit or 
investigation, thus establishing privity between 
itself and an auditor or investigator to whom it 
could look for protection. In addition, it might 
bargain with the client for special security . . . 
[or] insist[ ] that an audit be conducted on its 
behalf. 
834 P.2d at 765; see also Siliciano, Limits of Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 1956-57. These 
and other alternatives provide more efficient and less costly means for investors to protect their 
interests, and are far more equitable than post hoc attempts to hold an auditor with whom they 
had no dealings responsible as an all-purpose insurer for their unwise decisions. 
c. Overly Broad Liability Would Restrict the Availability, and 
Increase the Price, of Audit Services. 
The California Supreme Court observed that "the economic result of [expanded auditor liability] 
could just as easily be an increase in the cost and decrease in the availability of audits and audit 
reports with no compensating improvement in overall audit quality." Bily, 834 P.2d at 766. Other 
courts and commentators agree. 
Imposing expansive liability risks on accountants will increase the cost of accounting services. 
Accounting firms will be compelled to purchase vastly increased insurance protection at 
significantly higher costs (if such coverage is even available) or to self-insure against future 
liability.8 These increased costs will, in turn, be passed on to clients in the form of higher charges 
for auditing services. Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountant liability, 1988 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 213 (1988); "The increased costs incurred by professionals [as a result of 
expansive liability under the federal securities laws] may be passed on to their client companies, 
and in turn incurred by the company's investors." Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994). 
In many situations, auditing services may not be available at any price. As explained by the 
California Supreme Court: 
Auditors may rationally respond to increased 
liability by simply reducing audit services in 
fledgling industries where the business failure 
rate is high, reasoning that they will inevitably 
be singled out and sued when their client goes 
into bankruptcy regardless of the care or detail 
of their audits. 
Bily, 834 P.2d at 766; see Reed Abelson, Why Some Auditors Like the Taste of Leftovers, New 
York Times, June 29, 1997, at Section 3, p.1 (reporting that accounting firms are "loath [to audit 
companies that show the slightest hint of risk] due to litigation exposure") (See attached in 
Addendum A). 
Thus, "to the extent that the audit plays an important role in commerce, and particularly in the 
access of firms to the capital markets, increasing audit cost or decreasing audit availability may 
produce substantial barriers to the growth of firms that can no longer afford or qualify for 
accounting services." Siliciano, Limits of Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 1967 (footnote 
omitted). This factor therefore weighs strongly against expanded liability. 
B. The "Near Privity" Rule, Set Forth In Ultramares, As Reaffirmed By 
Credit Alliance, Best Serves The Important Public Policy Reasons For 
Limiting Auditor Liability To Third Parties. 
For the motion to dismiss, the Superior Court predicted what standard of accountant liability to 
noncontractual parties this Court would be likely to adopt. The Superior Court considered three 
standards that other states have utilized -- the "near privity" standard, Section 552 of the 
Requirement (Second) of Torts, and the "foreseeability" standard. As discussed below, the "near 
privity" standard -- which amici urge this Court to adopt -- best serves the important public 
policy considerations discussed above and tort principles because it limits liability to those 
circumstances where the accountant ought to know when a noncontractual party is relying on 
him or her: when there is evidence of specific linking conduct between the accountant and that 
party. Moreover, the "near privity" rule is most consistent with prior Massachusetts precedent. 
1. The "Near Privity" Rule Achieves the Balance of Limiting 
Liability to Those Circumstances Where an Auditor Is 
Properly Liable. 
The seminal case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), set forth what has 
been termed the "near privity" standard -- that actionable reliance by a noncontractual third party 
on an accountant's work product must have been known and intended by the accountant. 
The facts in Ultramares typify the circumstances in which noncontractual third parties sue 
accountants. There the auditor examined and reported upon its client's financial statements and 
supplied to the client thirty-two numbered copies of its audit report as counterpart originals to 
facilitate the client's use of the report. The client distributed a copy of the report to the plaintiff, a 
lender, in the normal course of the client's business. The plaintiff, allegedly in reliance upon the 
audit report, extended credit to the client company. The client company entered bankruptcy soon 
thereafter and defaulted on the plaintiff's loan. The plaintiff sued the accountant for negligence in 
the performance of the audit. 174 N.E. at 442-43. 
At the outset, Judge Cardozo noted the distant relationship between the accounting firm and "the 
indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might deal with the [accountant's 
client] in reliance on the audit." 174 N.E. at 446. The Ultramares court found that audits are 
provided primarily for the benefit of the client and serve as "a convenient instrumentality for use 
in the development of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to 
whom [the client] might exhibit it thereafter." Id. (emphasis added). 
The court, accordingly, held that an accountant's liability in negligence to a stranger to the audit 
contract is thus justified only where the third party's reliance was "not merely one possibility 
among many, but the 'end and aim of the transaction.'" 174 N.E. at 445 (citations omitted). The 
Ultramares court further clarified that a duty of care in favor of a third party requires a 
relationship considerably more intimate than one in which the accountant simply "expect[s] that 
the one who ordered the [report] would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as 
occasion might require." Id. The absence of such a relationship between the third party and the 
defendant accountant foreclosed the plaintiff's claim in Ultramares. 
More recently, in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the New York Court of 
Appeals revisited the issues addressed in Ultramares, and not only reaffirmed the viability of the 
principles articulated by Judge Cardozo, but also distilled a clear and useful three-part test to 
facilitate their application. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 
(1985). 
The facts in Credit Alliance were similar to those in Ultramares as well as to those before this 
Court. Plaintiffs were major financial service companies engaged in financing the purchase of 
capital equipment. Defendant was a national accounting firm that had examined the financial 
statements of a company, L.B. Smith, Inc. ("Smith"). Before providing Smith with financing, 
plaintiffs required that Smith transmit copies of its audited financial statements. When Smith 
later defaulted on its repayment obligations to the plaintiffs, the accounting firm was sued by 
plaintiffs for negligence in the performance of its auditing services, upon which the financing 
firms allegedly relied in supplying funds to Smith. 483 N.E.2d at 111-12. 
The Credit Alliance court first concluded that Ultramares had fully retained its vitality in the 
modern commercial context. 483 N.E.2d at 114-19. The court then set forth a three-part test 
derived from Ultramares and its progeny to facilitate the resolution of claims identical to that 
before this Court: 
Before accountants may be held liable in 
negligence to noncontractual parties who rely 
to their detriment on inaccurate financial 
reports, certain prerequisites must be satisfied: 
(1) the accountants must have been aware that 
the financial reports were to be used for a 
particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the 
furtherance of which a known party or parties 
was intended to rely; and (3) there must have 
been some conduct on the part of the 
accountants linking them to that party or 
parties, which evinces the accountants' 
understanding of that party or parties' reliance. 
483 N.E.2d at 118. To the extent there was ever any uncertainty under Ultramares, Credit 
Alliance clarified that liability in negligence can attach only to an accountant who knows and 
intends that his financial report will be used for a specific purpose by a specific party. 
Although Credit Alliance primarily reaffirmed principles first articulated in Ultramares, the third 
part of its liability standard added an important pleading and evidentiary test. By requiring that 
the plaintiff assert and prove affirmative conduct by the accountant that manifests his knowledge 
and intention as to a third party's reliance, Credit Alliance sought to expose conclusory 
allegations to pretrial dispositive motions. As a result, the last part of the Credit Alliance test has 
effectively eliminated at an early pretrial stage many meritless and potentially vexatious and 
protracted third-party lawsuits based on unsupported allegations that the accountant "knew" of 
the third party's reliance. 
The principles of Ultramares have gained the support of many courts for the better part of this 
century9. As these courts have recognized, the "near privity" rule best serves the important public 
policy reasons for limiting accountant liability to third parties. Moreover, the "specific linking 
conduct" requirement discourages the filing of frivolous lawsuits aimed at perceived "deep 
pocket" accountant defendants. At the least, the "near privity" standard allows the court to 
dispose of such claims more easily on pretrial motions, avoiding costly, unnecessary discovery. 
2. The "Near Privity" Rule Most Closely Comports With 
Massachusetts Authority and Policy. 
Contrary to Nycal's assertion, the "near privity" rule has essentially been adopted by this Court in 
a number of other circumstances. As noted above, in so holding, this Court has repeatedly cited 
to Ultramares and expressed serious reservations about liability theories that expose 
professionals to the potential of limitless liability to an indeterminate class of persons. Although 
this Court has not specifically addressed this issue in the context of accountant liability to non-
client third parties, the Court has consistently recognized and cited to the policies underlying the 
"near-privity" standard in limiting the liability of other professionals for negligent 
misrepresentations. 
In the seminal case Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351 Mass. 497 (1967), for example, this 
Court affirmed defendant engineer's liability to plaintiff contractor who, in building a road, relied 
upon stakes negligently placed by the defendant. This Court based its holding on the facts that 
the defendant knew (i) the exact identity of the contractor, (ii) that the purpose of placing the 
stakes was so that the plaintiff contractor could build a road, and (iii) that plaintiff would rely on 
the defendant's work. Id. at 500. This Court thus applied what is essentially the Credit Alliance 
test, determining that the professional was aware of the third parties' reliance, and that there was 
specific conduct linking the professional to the third party. This Court, in so holding, cited to 
Ultramares, finding that these facts eliminated the possibility of "liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Id. 
In Anthony v. Vaughan, 356 Mass. 673 (1970), this Court declined to find an insurance agent 
liable to a beneficiary of an insurance policy based on the agent's alleged negligent 
misrepresentations made at a meeting of officers and directors of an insured association. Again 
the test applied by this Court was, in essence, the Credit Alliance test. In rejecting plaintiff's 
theory of broad liability, this Court found that if recovery were permitted, it would extend to an 
indefinite number of unidentified members of the association holding an unknown number of 
policies, including members of the association who were not present at the meeting. Id. at 675. 
More recently, in Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 55 (1983), this Court declined to hold an attorney 
engaged by a bank mortgagee and the bank itself liable to the plaintiffs mortgagors based on the 
attorney's alleged negligent misrepresentation that the seller of the mortgaged property had good 
title to the mortgaged property. This Court distinguished Craig because in Craig, the defendant's 
performance had the stated purpose of benefiting the noncontractual party, "which, together with 
his knowledge of the plaintiff's identity, 'eliminate[d] any objection based upon limited liability.'" 
Id. at 65. In Page, however, the mortgage application explicitly stated that the "responsibility of 
the attorney for the mortgagee, is to protect the interest of the mortgagee . . . ." Id. at 57. 
Accordingly, the Court found that the attorney's work had been exclusively for the bank and, in 
any event, the plaintiffs had notice that they should not rely on the attorney's performance. In 
essence, this Court found an absence of the "linking conduct" that is required by the Credit 
Alliance standard.  
In short, this Court has already recognized the propriety of limitations on liability of 
professionals for alleged misrepresentations to third parties. This Court has, accordingly, 
required specific evidence of knowledge on the part of the professional that the noncontractual 
party was relying on the professional's conduct and that the reliance was reasonable -- the 
backbone of the Credit Alliance "near privity" rule. As demonstrated above, there are even more 
reasons why this Court should continue the application of these precepts to an accountant 
liability action brought by a third party. 
C. At a Minimum, the Court Should Adopt the Liability Standard 
Articulated in Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. 
The Superior Court predicted the adoption of Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1977). The Institute and Society believe that the narrower "near privity" standard is consistent 
with this Court's prior decisions and its reliance on the Ultramares doctrine and best addresses 
the important public policy considerations for limiting accountant liability to third parties. While 
the Society and Institute and Society view the adherence to the Court's precedent on professional 
liability to third parties for economic loss and the Ultramares doctrine as warranted, should the 
Court find otherwise, the Institute and Society strongly urge the Court to adopt, at a minimum, 
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Section 552"). 
Section 552 addresses liability for information negligently supplied for the guidance of others. 
By its terms, Section 552(2) limits accountant liability to losses suffered: 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the 
accountant] intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that [the accountant] intends the information to 
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(2)(a) and (b) (1977). 
Comment (a) to Section 552 further emphasizes that "one who relies upon information in 
connection with a commercial transaction may reasonably expect to hold the maker to a duty of 
care only in circumstances in which the maker was manifestly aware of the use to which the 
information was to be put and intended to supply it for that purpose." Section 552, comment at 
128 (emphasis added). The authors of the Restatement, like Judge Cardozo and many of the 
courts following Ultramares, were not blind to the advantageous policy ramifications of a 
properly delimited scope of liability. "By limiting the liability for negligence . . . to cases in 
which [the supplier of information] manifests an intent to supply the information for the sort of 
use in which the plaintiff's loss occurs, the law promotes the important social policy of 
encouraging the flow of commercial information upon which the operation of the economy 
rests." Id.10 
Recent courts applying Section 552 have emphasized that the reference in Section 552(2)(a) to a 
"group of persons" does not "expand[ ] professional liability for negligence to an unlimited class 
of persons whose presence is merely 'foreseeable.'" Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 
200 (Ga. 1987). Rather, Section 552 has been applied to bar claims asserted by creditors of an 
audit client where, as here, the record disclosed no facts indicating that the accountant knew and 
intended that such creditors would rely on the accountant's work product. Id. at 199-200. 
While the standard of the Restatement thus limits the ambit of accountant liability, it does create 
the possibility of liability to unknown but potentially foreseen parties. A likely consequence is 
that questionable claims will survive pre-trial motions, while the clarity of the "near-privity" 
standard would avoid this problem. 
Courts, in virtually every jurisdiction, as well as a host of commentators, have repeatedly 
recognized the wisdom of Justice Cardozo's admonitions against adopting a broad foreseeability 
standard and thereby making the liability for negligence coterminous with that for fraud. Nycal 
has proffered no good reason to disregard those admonitions.  
D. The Court Should Not Adopt the "Foreseeability" Standard 
Urged by Nycal Because It Is Inconsistent with Recognized 
Public Policy Considerations and Has Been Soundly Rejected 
by Numerous Courts and Legislatures. 
1. There Is No Legal Precedent or Other Support for the 
"Foreseeability" Standard. 
The "foreseeability" standard, which amounts to allowing negligence claims by any plaintiff 
whose reliance upon an accountant's work-product should have been foreseeable to the 
accountant, has been rejected by almost every court to have considered the issue because of the 
potentially unlimited liability that such a standard imposes upon accountants. The test does not 
take into account whether the party in question was actually known to the accountant at the time 
the financial report was prepared, or whether the party's reliance was intended by the accountant. 
Indeed, the only state whose highest court adopted this approach as a matter of common law was 
New Jersey. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). Significantly, however, the New 
Jersey legislature subsequently overruled the court by enacting a statute setting forth a near-
privity standard. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-25 (West Supp. 1997). 
In Rosenblum, plaintiff stock-purchasers claimed to have relied to their detriment upon financial 
statements audited by defendant accounting firm and delivered to them during merger 
negotiations with the corporation. The Rosenblum court acknowledged the objections to the 
foreseeability test as potentially giving rise to "unknown costs . . . so severe that accounting 
firms will not be able to absorb the losses that will be visited upon them . . .," but, unlike the vast 
majority of courts to address this issue, its view was that "[t]he reasonableness of this concern is 
questionable." 461 A.2d at 151. 
In addition to having been squarely rejected by the New Jersey Legislature, the reasoning of the 
Rosenblum court has been widely criticized11 and, accordingly, should not be considered as 
persuasive authority by this Court. In fact, no other court has adopted the standard articulated by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court that Nycal advocates. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987) (cited by Nycal), the court adopted a rule akin to a 
foreseeability rule solely because of a Mississippi statute that precluded privity from being a 
barrier to an action in negligence. In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 
361 (1983) (also cited by Nycal), the court set forth essentially a "balancing test" derived from 
Wisconsin negligence law that requires courts to consider, a number of "public policy" factors to 
determine whether a limitation on accountant liability may be warranted, despite "foreseeability." 
Thus, the legislatively-rejected Rosenblum case stands alone in the reasoning it espouses. As 
courts rejecting it and commentators criticizing it have noted, it simply ignores the numerous 
important reasons for limitations on accountant liability. 
For example, under a foreseeability standard, an auditor would have no ability to control its risk, 
given that the auditor's client could disseminate the report to a myriad of arguably "foreseeable" -
- but not necessarily known or intended -- recipients, such as stockholders, potential investors, 
lenders, suppliers, rating agencies, potential purchasers and potential creditors. Further, as 
discussed supra at pp. 16-18, the foreseeability standard would not lead to a higher standard of 
practice by accountants because accountants already have numerous existing incentives to 
perform their work with the greatest amount of care possible. By adding the burden of potentially 
crippling liability by making accountants all-purpose insurers for anyone who argues that its 
reliance was "foreseeable," this rule is more likely to be counterproductive than to assist in the 
effective rendering of accounting services. 
Further, under an expansive negligence standard, third parties who suffer losses when an audit 
client becomes insolvent -- and who, therefore, are unable to recover from the client -- have 
strong incentive to exaggerate their reliance on the audit in order to try to recover their losses 
from the solvent accountant. Such a claim could rest entirely on "uncorroborated oral evidence of 
many of the crucial elements of his claim, and still be sufficient to go to the jury." As the Bily 
court concluded: 
a foreseeability rule applied in this context 
inevitably produces large numbers of 
expensive and complex lawsuits of 
questionable merit as scores of investors and 
lenders seek to recoup business losses. In view 
of the prospects of vast if not limitless liability 
for the "thoughtless slip or blunder," the 
availability of other efficient means of self-
protection for a generally sophisticated class of 
plaintiffs, and the dubious benefits of a broad 
rule of liability, we opt for a more 
circumscribed approach. In so doing, we seek 
to deter careless audit reporting while avoiding 
the spectre of a level of liability that is morally 
and economically excessive. 
834 P.2d at 767. 
The Society and Institute submit that, in light of the importance of the issue at stake, the widely-
rejected logic of the legislatively-reversed Rosenblum decision does not represent a trend that 
this jurisdiction, or any other, should follow. 
2. The PSLRA Only Further Supports Limitations on 
Accountant Liability. 
Nycal's repeated reference to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the 
"PSLRA"), too, is misguided. It has little or no bearing on the issue before the Court -- the 
liability standard applicable to state common-law tort claims -- except perhaps to highlight that 
Congress itself has recognized the need for limits on auditor liability. 
One of the announced purposes of the PSLRA was to limit certain securities claims in 
recognition of the disproportionate liability that has resulted. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 
(1995). Specifically, the PSLRA was "prompted by significant evidence of abuse in private 
securities lawsuits" and was designed in large part to limit "the targeting of deep pocket 
defendants, including accountants . . . without regard to their actual culpability." Id. at 31 
(emphasis added). 
In short, the PSLRA adds nothing to the debate, except to emphasize the propriety of and need 
for strict and defined limits on liability of accountants to non-contractual parties. 
V. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge this Court to follow its own precedent on professional 
liability for economic loss, and that virtually every other jurisdiction that has considered this 
issue in the context of accountant liability, in recognizing the need for limitations on liability of 
accountants, and to adopt the "near-privity" standard of liability as the standard for accountant 
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